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FIRST DAY SECTION TWO 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - July 27, 2004 
Write your answers to Questions 6 and 7 in Answer Booklet D - (the 
PURPLE booklet) 
6. Gulliver's Metal Fabricators ("Gulliver's") is a North Carolina corporation with 
its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. Gulliver's has a fabrication plant in 
Roanoke, Virginia. True Restoration Corp. ("TRC"), a factory building contractor, is a 
Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Silver Spring, Maryland. 
In 2001, Gulliver's sustained significant damage to its Roanoke, Virginia, fabrication 
plant during a fire. Gulliver's contracted with TRC to undertake the rebuilding of the plant. 
TRC's engineers visited Gulliver's plant in Roanoke, evaluated the work needed, consulted with 
Gulliver's Roanoke plant manager about the scope of the work, and reported back to Silver 
Spring. TRC's vice president in Silver Spring prepared the written contract, signed it, and sent it 
to Gulliver's headquarters in Charlotte. The construction contract provided for repairs to be 
performed in Roanoke on a time-and-material basis. The construction contract did not contain a 
governing law provision. The vice president of Gulliver's in Charlotte reviewed and signed the 
contract and returned it to TRC in Silver Spring. 
Over the next four months, TRC submitted bills to the Gulliver's factory in Roanoke. 
Each invoice described the work performed, the material supplied, and the labor hours devoted to 
the work applicable to that invoice. The plant manager forwarded the bills to the headquarters in 
Charlotte for payment directly to TRC. Gulliver's reviewed and timely paid all invoices with 
checks sent from Charlotte to Silver Spring. 
A portion of the restored building collapsed within 30 days after all work had been 
completed. An insurance agent for Gulliver's investigated the loss and determined that much of 
the work reflected on the invoices from TRC, in fact, had not been done and that TRC had 
intentionally misrepresented the scope of actual repairs. 
Gulliver's bas filed a two-count complaint in Roanoke in the Federal District Court for 
the Western District of Virginia for the cost to repair the factory again and for punitive damages. 
Jurisdiction is properly based on diversity of citizenship. In Count I, Gulliver's alleges that TRC 
breached its contract with Gulliver's. In Count II, Gulliver's alleges that TRC defrauded 
Gulliver's by submitting fraudulent invoices for work not actually performed. TRC denies all 
wrongdoing and moves to dismiss both counts. 
The presiding judge seeks guidance on which state's laws (North Carolina, Virginia, 
Maryland) govern the disposition of each count. Specifically, the Court has requested the parties 
to answer the following questions: 
(a) Which state's choice-of-law rules apply in this action? Explain fully. 
!This' question continues on the next pag~ 
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(b) As to Count I (Breach of Contract), which state' s law governs (1) the 
interpretation of the contract and (2) questions relating to performance of 
contractual duties? Explain fully. 
(c) As to Count II (Fraud), which state's law applies? Explain fully. 
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7. In 2000, Bill Brown, a 50-year-old resident of Roanoke, Virginia, who had never 
been married, validly executed a will that had been prepared by his attorney, Joe Smith. This 
2000 will provided: 
"I give and devise my estate as follows : 
1. My house on Main Street in Roanoke to my 
friend, Samantha; 
2. $25,000 to my faithful employee, Geraldine; 
3. All the rest and residue of my estate to the 
South Roanoke Baptist Church. 
I name Samantha as the Executor of my estate. " 
In 2002, Brown had Smith prepare another will, which Brown also validly executed. 
This 2002 will provided: 
" I hereby revoke all prio r wills . I give and devise 
my estate as f o llows : 
1 . My house on Main Street in Roanoke to my 
friend, Samantha; 
2 . $25, 000 to my faithful employee, Geraldine; 
3. All the rest and residue of my estate to the 
Art Museum of Western Virginia. 
I name Samantha as the Executor of my estate." 
Smith retained the executed originals of both wills in his office. 
In 2003, Brown learned that the Art Museum of Western Virginia was planning to build a 
$50 million facility, including an Imax theater, and vacate its present premises. Brown was 
infuriated at what appeared to him to be a senseless use of assets and decided that he preferred 
the provisions of his 2000 will over those of the 2002 will. He handwrote, dated, and signed the 
following letter to Smith: 
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"March l , 2003 
I wish to revoke my 2002 will and want you to take the 
necessary action to accomplish this. I wish my 2000 will to be 
effective as my last will and testament. 
(sf Bill Brown" 
Upon receipt of this letter from Brown, Smith wrote "Revoked" in large letters across 
each page of the 2002 will. He attached Brown's letter to the 2000 will and placed both wills in 
his file. 
Later in 2003, Brown sold the Main Street house that he owned at the times he had 
executed each of the wills and purchased a new house, also on Main Street in Roanoke. 
Also in 2003, Geraldine died, survived by two children. 
Brown died on January 15, 2004. He was survived by Samantha, Geraldine's two 
children, and Robert, a nephew, who would be Brown's sole heir under the Virginia laws of 
intestate succession. 
Brown's estate consists of the new house on Main Street and stock, bonds, and checking 
accounts. Samantha, Geraldine's two children, Robert, Art Museum of Western Virginia, and 
South Roanoke Baptist Church all claim the right to take from Brown's estate. 
Under which will, if either, and to whom should Brown's estate be distributed? Explain 
fully. 
. ~er11inder: .. V'r.l~e yo.u.r ansVY:er t,Q .the rAB9VE; .. H9e~tion k 
, "' 
1 
' ~i#t -.in Boqkl~i Cl ·;;,, the· .. Puspt..1# Booklet! ~:.A. ·"; .. ·v ,/' 
* * * * * 
~~ Now SWITCH to the GREEN Answer Booklet - Booklet E ~~ 
Write your answer to Questions 8 and 9 in Answer Booklet E - (the GREEN 
booklet). 
8. In 1995, Clayton and Marcus formed Dolphin Car Rentals, Inc. ("Dolphin"), a 
Virginia corporation. They were the only officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporation. 
They regularly observed all corporate formalities. For several years, the business thrived, but 
increasing fuel prices and competition adversely affected their operations, and after 2001, 
Dolphin operated at a substantial annual loss. 
In early 2004, Dolphin closed its doors and ceased doing business. At the time of its 
closing, Dolphin had millions of dollars in unpaid debt. The only asset it owned free and clear 
was the real property on which its main office was located in Norfolk, Virginia. 
On February 10, 2004, Dolphin contracted to sell the Norfolk property to Purchaser for 
SECTION TWO Page4 
$1,000,000. Purchaser retained ABC Title Insurance Co. ("ABC") to examine title to the 
property and insure that title was free of defects and that there were no unpaid liens on it. ABC 
assured itself that record title was free of defects and obtained an affidavit from Marcus as 
president of Dolphin that, to the best of his knowledge, the property was free of liens. ABC 
issu~d an owner's title insurance policy to Purchaser, and the deal closed on March 1, 2004. 
In the closing instructions to the settlement agent, Clayton and Marcus directed that the 
$1,000,000 sales proceeds be distributed as follows: $200,000 to Dolphin' s corporate checking 
account, $400,000 to Marcus's personal account, and $400,000 to Clayton's personal account. 
The funds were distributed accordingly. The $200,000 in the corporate checking account was 
used to pay some of Dolphin's trade creditors. Clayton and Marcus promptly moved the money 
elsewhere and closed these personal accounts. 
Unbeknownst to Clayton and Marcus, on February 2, 2004, Fordham Motors, an 
automobile manufacturer from which Dolphin bought part of its rental fleet, obtained a default 
judgment against Dolphin for $400,000 in the Fairfax Circuit Court. On February 28, 2004, 
Fordham recorded an abstract of the judgment in the Norfolk Cir(,(uit Court. ABC's title 
examiner failed to include mention of the judgment in the title report to Purchaser. 
In April 2004, when Fordham Motors learned of the sale of the real property to 
Purchaser, it presented proof of its judgment lien to Purchaser which, in turn, demanded that 
ABC clear the title to the property by paying off Fordham's lien. ABC settled the claim and paid 
Fordham $400,000. Fordham assigned to ABC all the rights it had against Dolphin, Clayton, and 
Marcus, thus conferring on ABC the right to sue them directly. 
ABC then sued Clayton and Marcus, asserting the following claims: (i) that the court 
should pierce the corporate veil and hold Clayton and Marcus jointly and severally liable for the 
debt to Fordham; (ii) that, by distributing the funds to themselves, Clayton and Marcus violated 
Virginia corporation law; and (iii) that, by distributing the funds to themselves, Clayton and 
Marcus violated the Virginia law against fraudulent conveyances. 
What is the likelihood that ABC will prevail on each of its claims against Clayton and 
Marcus? Explain fully. 
* * * * * 
9. Andy owns a retail seafood fish outlet in Virginia Beach, Virginia. On April 1, 
2004, he received a phone call from Willa, a seafood wholesaler from whom Andy had 
occasionally bought frozen fish and whom he had found reliable. Willa said she had just 
received information on a shipment of frozen Atlantic salmon worth $8,000 and that she could 
get it for Andy for $5,000 if Andy was prepared to act quickly. Andy expressed interest, so 
Willa told him to wire the $5,000 to her bank account immediately so she could seal the deal 
with the shipper. 
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Relying on Willa's representations that the shipment contained first quality salmon that 
had been properly packed and handled, Andy wired the funds and, in due course, received the 
shipment. In fact, the refrigerated container in which the salmon had been shipped had 
malfunctioned, causing the salmon to thaw and spoil. Knowing this, Willa had acquired the 
shipment cheaply, refrozen it, and intentionally concealed the information from Andy. 
Andy, unable to sell the spoiled salmon, subsequently learned the foregoing facts. 
When Willa refused to give Andy his money back, Andy filed the following two-count motion 
for judgment against Willa in Circuit Court for the City of Virginia Beach and properly served it: 
"Plaintiff moves for judgment against defendant on 
the grounds and in the amount set forth below: 
First Count (Breach of Contract): 
1. On or about April 1, 2004, plaintiff and defendant 
agreed in a transaction conducted over the telephone, 
that plaintiff would purchase and defendant would 
sell one shipping container of frozen salmon for 
$5,000. 
2 . Plaintiff paid the $5,000 price for the salmon by 
wire transfer of the funds to defendant's bank 
account as agreed. 
3. Defendant delivered the frozen salmon, which was 
spoiled and not saleable. 
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against 
defendant as hereinafter set forth. 
Second Count (Fraud): 
4. Plaintiff by this reference incorporates the 
allegations of the First Count as if fully set forth 
herein. 
5. By defendant's acts as set forth in the foregoing 
allegations, defendant defrauded plaintiff. 
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against 
defendant as follows: 
a ) On the breach of contract count, in the amount of 
$5,000. 
b) On the fraud count, in the amount of $5,000 plus 
punitive damages according to proof. 
c) For costs expended in this action. 
/s/ Andy 
Appearing Pro Se" 
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(a) What type of pleading can Willa file to challenge the sufficiency of the 
allegations in Andy's motion for judgment, on what grounds can she challenge 
each of the counts, and how should the court rule on each ground of challenge? 
Explain fully. 
(b) Assume Willa successfully challenges each count and that the court grants Andy 
leave to amend the motion for judgment. Based on the facts of the transaction as 
stated above, what facts can Andy plead in an amended motion for judgment that 
will survive further challenge to his breach of contract and fraud claims? Explain 
fully. 
Rettlinder: Write your answer to the ABOVE question 
#9 in Booklet E - the GREEN Booklet. 
* * * * * 
Proceed to the short answer questions in Booklet F - (the 
PINK Booklet). 
